Assimetria da informação entre eleitores e candidatos na era da internet: um olhar regulatório

Abstract

The purpose of this article is to identify how regulation could contribute to the Internet being used to reduce voter information deficits on candidates for positions in the executive and legislative branches. To account for this goal, first, the author takes an approach on internet search systems to correlate them to election choices. It then presents the limits and challenges for us using the Internet as an increment in the electoral process. Soon after, it examines the legal norms that discipline the information on the Internet, from which it concludes that there is a portion of the information that still demands treatment. As a consequence, there is room for a regulatory look at problems arising from activities carried out on the internet. Based on a rational and structured regulatory analysis of the problems verified and the corresponding weighting with the benefits offered by the internet, it concludes by the possibility of adopting some measures for the Internet to reduce the information asymmetry.